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Private not-for-profit organizations combine characteristics of a public sector agency with 
those of a private, proprietary firm. In particular, nonprofits are required to address 
designated social missions while breaking even financially. This structure underlies the 
difficulty that nonprofit organizations face in making decisions with important resource 
implications. Specifically, choices that would achieve maximal mission impact may differ 
from choices that reward the organization in purely financial terms. As a result, nonprofit 
managers face a variety of trade-offs between mission responsive and financially rewarding 
actions. This paper considers some of these tradeoffs in the context of pricing decisions by 
nonprofit organizations. In particular, the paper draws on alternative theories of nonprofit 
pricing from the literature.  In one theory, nonprofits are viewed as revenue maximizers, 
pricing their services to garner as much net revenue as possible to support their 
organizations.  In an alternative theory, nonprofits are conceived as mission maximizers, 
pricing their services to achieve maximum mission impact within the constraint of financial 
solvency. The efficacy of these theories is explored through five case studies of 
organizations offering a variety of services within the context of a local social services 
federation.  Evidence from these cases suggests that the forgoing theories apply in some 
combination for any given nonprofit organization.  Several different behavioral patterns 
are found, including nonprofits seeking to balance financial and mission impacts in the 
pricing policies for each of their service offerings and others pursuing a strategic mix of 
pricing policies for profitable and mission-impacting services.  It is clear from all cases 
observed that nonprofit managers struggle with mission-market tensions as they relate to 
pricing and that they can benefit from metrics to help them sort through these decisions in 
ways that resolve these tensions.     
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Introduction 
Structurally, private not-for-profit organizations combine characteristics of a public sector 
agency with those of a private, proprietary firm. In particular, nonprofits are required to 
address designated social missions while breaking even financially. As a result, nonprofits 
are often described as having a “double bottom-line”, that is both a financial and 
programmatic standard by which their performance is to be assessed (Bell- Rose, 2004; 
Clark et al, 2004). In fact, from a normative point of view, the notion of a double-bottom 
line is misleading. Achievement of the mission is the bottom line, while financial success 
may be prerequisite to such achievement. While devices such as double-bottom lines or 
balanced scorecards (Kaplan and Norton, 1996; Clark et al, 2004) may be helpful 
management tools, they can be counterproductive if allowed to obfuscate the ultimate 
criterion of success. 
 
In terms of a positive theory, however, it is less clear how nonprofits actually behave. As 
organizations have a natural inclination to survive and grow, their managers and leaders are 
as likely to be judged by standards of organizational sustainability and growth as by any 
objective measure of mission achievement. This behavioral reality underlies the difficulty 
that nonprofit organizations face in making decisions with important resource implications 
(James, 1998). Specifically, choices that would achieve maximal mission impact may differ 
from choices that reward the organization in purely financial terms. As a result, nonprofit 
managers require clear focus, strong discipline and appropriate measurements in order to 
keep to the normatively prescribed path, and they face a variety of trade-offs between 
mission-responsive and financially rewarding actions. 
 
Certainly nonprofits are not entirely unique in facing mission/market tensions and requiring 
a clear focus and direction. For-profit businesses and governmental organizations also have 
missions and must sustain themselves economically. And sometimes business or 
government executives will, for personal or other reasons, be dedicated to mission in ways 
that fail to align completely with maximum financial gain or to the prevailing political 
mandate that drives the allocation of public resources. However, mission/market tension is 
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generally more wrenching for nonprofits because financial sustenance and mission 
achievement are less likely to be as congruent as they are in business or government. In 
business, mission is generally instrumental to the ultimate goals of profit-making and 
wealth enhancement of owners and stockholders. Thus, missions are often adjusted or 
reframed with this in mind, usually without extraordinary conflict. In government, agencies 
are charged with a mission through the same political process that allocates their resources, 
so tensions between mission and market may be restricted to bureaucratic enclaves that 
challenge the majority view. For nonprofits, however, financial success is instrumental to 
the achievement of social mission, while the acquisition of financial resources often 
requires choices that can limit mission effectiveness. For example, financial success can be 
enhanced by selling services to those who can better afford to pay, or by promoting causes 
that are popular with certain donors, although such actions may short change the social 
mission for which the organization was established. Thus, special tensions are created that 
can pit organizational prosperity against mission achievement. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to consider how tensions between mission and market 
manifest themselves in the context of nonprofit pricing decisions. Using case studies and 
some simple metrics, we explore the efficacy of two alternative theories.  One theory 
posits that nonprofits simply price their services in a manner that maximizes their net 
revenue. This is a bureaucratic model premised on organizational sustenance and growth 
within the constraints of addressing demand in a particular field of service. A second theory 
posits that nonprofits price their services to maximize mission impact, often forgoing 
revenue potential in the process of targeting their services.  This is a classical view of 
nonprofits as organizations seeking to achieve maximum social good within financial 
constraints.  We investigate these theories at two levels: nonprofits make pricing decisions 
for each of the individual services they offer but they also commonly offer multiple 
services.  One possibility is that nonprofits follow the same pricing logic for each service 
they offer.  Another possibility is that they mix their logics in order to achieve some 
combination of mission impact and financial success. 
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Literature Review 
Mission-market tension is not a new issue for nonprofits. Indeed, it has been examined in 
various forms over the past two decades, though with much greater attention since the 
1990s. The literature on mission-market tensions can be traced to studies of nonprofit-
government relations and concerns about “vendorism” in the delivery of social services. 
Kramer (1981) worried that heavy reliance on government funding in the form of purchase 
of service contracts would lead nonprofit social service agencies to become service delivery 
appendages to government and lose their independent perspectives as advocates for 
improvements in social welfare policy. More specifically, Young and Finch (1977), 
studying nonprofit foster care agencies, recognized the constraining factors on their 
mission-related behavior deriving from government per diem funding. However, a general 
review of research on this subject by Kramer (1987) found “the dysfunctional consequences 
of agencies receiving public funds [namely] dependency, cooptation and a dilution of 
advocacy and autonomy, goal deflection and loss of an agency’s voluntaristic character 
through increased bureaucratization and professionalization” to be “considerably 
exaggerated” (p.247).  Nonetheless, these concerns continued to build and a key study by 
Smith and Lipsky (1993) expressed considerable alarm over the loss of autonomy by 
nonprofit social service organizations stemming from contracting with government. 
 
Paradoxically, recent research studies have been more concerned with changes in the public 
funding environment that have driven nonprofit social service organizations towards greater 
involvement in the private marketplace, with other mission vs. market consequences. In 
particular, Alexander (1999) noted that, especially for smaller and medium sized 
community and faith-based nonprofit organizations, changes in government policies, 
including funding cutbacks, cost pressures deriving from new reporting and staffing 
requirements, opening of competition with for-profit suppliers, and a more distressed 
clientele population, have created financial pressures that force nonprofits to make mission-
related compromises, including raising prices, retrenching certain services, redirecting 
services away from the neediest clients, and reducing emphasis on research, education and 
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advocacy for client needs. Indeed, similar coping strategies were documented by 
Liebschutz (1992) when funding cutbacks occurred during the Reagan administration. 
 
The State of Nonprofit America project led by Lester Salamon (2002) made a special point 
of highlighting mission/market tensions, citing growing reliance and pervasiveness of fee 
revenues, an increasingly entrepreneurial culture within the nonprofit sector, growing 
involvement of nonprofits with corporate partners, and intensifying competition with for-
profit service providers. With these forces in play, Salamon observed: “The move to the 
market may thus be posing a far greater threat to the nonprofit sector’s historic social 
justice and civic mission than the growth of government support before it.” (p.47). 
 
Mission/market tensions appear to take different forms in different fields of service. For 
example, in social services Smith (2002) highlights increasing for-profit competition, the 
advent of managed care arrangements, and a new emphasis on performance measurement 
that requires nonprofits to focus on service output measures to the possible neglect of less 
quantifiable accomplishments in advocacy or work with more difficult clients for whom it 
is harder to show results. In health care, Gray and Schlesinger (2002) note that increased 
competition with for-profit providers, and pressures from third party payers to control costs, 
have reduced the ability of nonprofits to devote resources to their traditional public service 
missions such as education and charity care. These researchers cite a convergence in the 
behaviors of for-profit and nonprofit providers, noting that “Even where nonprofits have 
maintained their role, they have often found it necessary to respond to the challenges 
confronting them in the health care field by becoming more like commercial enterprises.” 
(p.92). Indeed, in the hospital field, the U.S. Senate Finance Committee recently asked 
pointed questions of major institutions about the nature of their charitable work and the 
degree to which it may be compromised by market-oriented practices (Trefinger, 2005). 
 
In higher education, Stewart, Kane and Scruggs (2002) find institutions struggling, in the 
context of escalating costs, to set tuitions that will allow good students of modest means to 
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attend, and to cope with new for-profit competitors and pressures from corporate funders to 
commercialize research. Kirp’s (2003) in-depth study of the practices of a selected sample 
of U.S. universities expresses particular concern about the infusion of business values into 
American higher education. 
 
In the arts, Wyszomiriski (2002) cites the uncertainty and instability of government funding, 
escalating costs, changes in technology and competition with the profit-making sector.  
Pressures to increase earned income have resulted in “..changes in marketing, more 
emphasis on entrepreneurial activities, and a sharper concern for cultivating new audiences 
and new donors” (p.191). These developments are forcing nonprofit arts organizations to 
continually reconcile their mission foci with market incentives and pressures, and 
reappraise their relationships with the business sector and with for-profit arts organizations. 
 
Studies of mission/market tensions in nonprofits generally recognize the complexity of the 
issues and the challenges nonprofit managers face in dealing with them. Dees (1998), for 
example, argues that nonprofits span a wide spectrum of motivations and interests, ranging 
from philanthropic to commercial, and that this richness can be a source of innovation and 
increased capacity so long as social mission is kept firmly in mind. Other authors such as 
Weisbrod (2004) and Foster and Bradach (2005) complain that nonprofits’ pursuit of 
commercial ventures is diverting these organizations from fulfilling their social missions. A 
common theme is the need for nonprofits to maintain a clear identity and focus tied to 
social mission. To do that, various authors cite the need for better means of measuring 
nonprofit performance in order to reconcile financial and mission-related performance. For 
example, Bell-Rose (2004) suggests a social return on investment approach and the use of 
logic models to identify intermediary indicators that lead to desired social outcomes. 
Anheier (2005) reviews several other generic approaches to nonprofit performance 
measurement, including Kendall’s and Knapp’s production of welfare framework, the 
balanced scorecard, corporate dashboards, benchmarking, and other sets of performance 
measures developed by umbrella organizations such as Independent Sector, the National 
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Council of Voluntary Organizations, and United Way of America. And Paton (2003) offers 
a comprehensive study of performance measurement in “social enterprises”. An interesting 
dimension of Paton’s analysis is his inquiry into whether performance measurement itself, 
often encouraged or imposed by outside (market) agents, can compromise mission in the 
quest of better performance.  
 
Conceptual Framework 
While tensions between financial return and mission-achievement in the nonprofit context 
are problematic, these goals are not necessarily in diametric opposition. Given that 
nonprofits are intended to address a social mission, financial performance may be viewed 
as an instrumental variable contributing to that mission. The degree to which financial 
success is required to achieve mission may indeed depend on the nature of the mission. In 
some cases, nonprofits may legitimately decide to use their resources in a time-limited 
manner to achieve some goal, and then disband when resources are depleted. The Markey 
Trust provides one such illustration where a foundation (Dickason and Neuhauser, 2000) 
decided to concentrate its grant making for biomedical research over a limited period of 
time. Similarly, the John M. Olin Foundation is intentionally closing up shop after having 
financed a generation of conservative intellectual programming (DeParle, 2005). In these 
and other cases, part of the rationale for the time limitation was to concentrate resources on 
the mission, to avoid having that mission become obsolete, and to limit spending funds on 
maintaining the organization. 
 
However, time-limited nonprofits are the exception rather than the rule. The classic case of 
a nonprofit deciding to continue operations once the mission was achieved is the March of 
Dimes, which adopted a new mission to address birth defects once polio was cured (Bowen 
et al, 1994). Here the rationale was that the existing organizational infrastructure 
represented valuable capital that could be effectively redeployed for a new, related mission. 
Unfortunately, many nonprofits fail to address the desirability of sustainability and growth 
explicitly. Many organizations die a slow death or slide into dormancy without ever 
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determining if this was the best way to allocate charitable resources. Indeed, it is even hard 
to find official records of what happened to many nonprofit organizations that stopped 
reporting their operations or filing tax returns (Bowen et al, 1994). 
 
Given that most nonprofits decide, implicitly or otherwise, that ongoing economic viability 
is a prerequisite to mission achievement, further understanding of their behavior can be 
developed through the theory of nonprofit organizations as multi-product firms – first 
proposed by James (1983) and later expanded by Weisbrod et al (1998). In this framework, 
nonprofit organizations are viewed as producing two kinds of services – those which are 
profitable and help sustain the organization, and those which directly impact its mission and 
may require subsidy. If managers of the organization intend to maximize its mission impact 
while maintaining financial integrity, their challenge is to find just the right combination of 
these two types of activities. Hence, in each instance they must determine what the 
objective of the activity is – profit or mission impact – and then design effective policies for 
its execution. 
 
In reality, nonprofit activities are not necessarily cleanly separable into profit making and 
mission-focused activity. Rather, many nonprofit activities combine both objectives. For 
example, a fund raising event may have a community-building objective as well as a 
financial one. And a mainstream mission focused activity such as providing day care for 
young children may be counted on to produce a certain level of revenues as well as to 
achieve a social goal. In all cases, however, the nonprofit manager must deal explicitly with 
the balance of financial and mission goals and the tensions between them. Thus, while a 
double bottom line rationale is dubious for the organization as a whole, it commonly 
applies in some way to the components of activity that make up the nonprofit’s overall 
portfolio of activity.  
     
Pricing. Nonprofit organizations produce many services for which charging a fee is feasible, 
i.e., where it is possible, at reasonable cost, to exclude people from consuming the service 
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unless they pay for it. Such nonprofit services include arts performances, museum visits, 
social service counseling, day care, educational programs, health and mental health 
treatment services, memberships in YMCAs and JCCs, gift shop sales and many others. 
While certain nonprofit products, such as policy advocacy or public art cannot be priced, a 
host of nonprofit services certainly can. The real questions are whether prices should be 
charged, and if so, how price schedules should be designed. 
 
From a market incentive viewpoint, any excludable nonprofit service can be priced in such 
a way as to maximize net revenues, although in some cases (e.g. high fixed costs and 
modest demand) even a profit maximizing price may result in losses (negative profits; see 
Young and Steinberg, 1995). Given the decision to produce such a service, a nonprofit 
manager responding solely to market incentives will likely decide (a) to charge a price, and 
(b) to set prices in a manner that yields maximum net revenues. From a mission viewpoint, 
however, the price decision could be quite different. If charging a price substantially 
contravenes the mission or values of the organization, the mission-driven manager may 
decide not to charge a price at all. A Free Clinic that provides basic health care services to 
indigent or uninsured community residents is based on the very notion of free care. An 
endowed museum established as a community resource may have a long standing tradition 
of free access to galleries that is considered intrinsic to its institutional identity. 
 
 In many other cases, however, the imposition of a fee is accepted. Here, the mission-
market tension is manifested in the nature of the pricing policy or fee schedule. For 
example, maximizing mission impact may require servicing as many clients as possible. 
Such services may be associated with “external benefits” that accrue to society at large as 
well as to the individuals who actually consume the service. Examples include children in 
pre-school programs, recipients of inoculations for various diseases, clients in therapeutic 
mental health or substance abuse programs, or visitors to museums. In such cases, mission 
focus favors a price lower than that which would maximize net revenues (Young and 
Steinberg, 1995). 
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 Furthermore, a mission-driven pricing policy may wish to differentiate among alternative 
groups of consumers. Fine arts organizations or institutions of higher education may wish 
to encourage younger consumers or accommodate lower income community residents. 
Accordingly, they may wish to tailor price schedules, e.g. through sliding scales or other 
differential measures. A net-revenue maximizing price policy might also employ price 
discrimination so as to better capture the willingness to pay of high demanders. But in 
general, such a market responsive pricing policy would not reflect a prejudice to serve any 
particular societal group aside from those who can pay. 
 
In order to resolve the mission-market tension in pricing decisions, the nonprofit 
organization must first decide the particular purpose of any given service or activity. If the 
gift shop or facility rental program is designed solely for fund raising purposes, then the 
tension is resolved by recognizing that the rules for profit-maximizing pricing apply. If, on 
the other hand, the children’s concert series or the vaccination program is intended to 
maximize mission impact then pricing must be designed to serve the target groups and to 
maximize the net social benefits associated with consumption by those groups. 
 
Often, nonprofits find it difficult to make such a clear differentiation between mission-
serving and revenue generating programs. In particular, some programs may serve both 
purposes. A nonprofit might decide as a matter of policy or fiscal discipline, for example, to 
run a day care service on a break even basis. This may be an appropriate value judgment in 
the context of the larger picture of how the organization intends to maximize its overall 
social impact. In essence, it says that the day care program should maximize its mission 
benefits within an imposed fiscal constraint. Setting that constraint at zero profits is only 
one of many possible choices, depending on the availability of financial support from other 
sources. 
 
Finally, it is worth observing that over time there may be homogenizing forces at work in 
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nonprofit pricing practices. Under intense competition a nonprofit must price its services to 
permit economic survival, no different from its for-profit or nonprofit competitors. In 
particular, as traditionally nonprofit service areas open up to for-profit provision, or where 
government changes the form of its support from supply-side grants and contracts to 
demand side vouchers and reimbursements, nonprofits often lose the flexibility to 
differentiate their pricing practices from competitors in order to address mission-related 
objectives. Nonetheless, the tension between mission and market remains, even if the 
ability to adjust to mission imperatives is highly constrained. 
 
Recent experiences of the Salvation Army and the American Red Cross illustrate several of 
the tensions and issues associated with nonprofit pricing.  In September 2003, the 
Salvation Army chapter in Louisville, Kentucky began to charge homeless families $5 per 
night after the first week, for staying the night at its downtown shelter. The shelter policy 
had a dual purpose: to help alleviate a budget crisis and as “an incentive to pull people out 
of homelessness”(AP, 2003b). In the Louisville chapter, 12 workers were laid off in that 
year due to budget pressures which originated in part from accommodating some homeless 
people at the shelters for several months.  Although the $5 fee was far below the 
(marginal) cost to house and feed a person for one night, and the shelter makes exceptions 
for those who cannot pay, the policy faced harsh criticism from the National Coalition for 
the Homeless. After the story was published in a national newspaper, the local Salvation 
Army director rescinded the fee (AP, 2003a). 
 
It is clear in this case that the Salvation Army was aware of the tensions associated with 
charging a fee for staying in the shelter; its designation of a $5 price was designed to 
produce some revenue while not impacting seriously on the emergency use of the shelter.  
However, the organization may have misgauged the level of mission-market tension here, 
and needed to recognize that any fee at all was going to adversely affect the people it was 
charged to help.  Hence, some other means of raising revenue to alleviate budget pressures 
was probably preferable – perhaps donations from some of the individuals who objected to 
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the fee policy or from government agencies charged with keeping homeless people off the 
streets. Without such an alternative, however, imposing the fee might still have been better 
than having to close down or reduce capacity. 
    
The American Red Cross (ARC) provides two key fee-based products/services: blood 
products and health and safety education.  Blood products are managed centrally by the 
Biomedical Services department and depend almost entirely on fees.  Health and safety 
education is managed by local chapters and supported by fees and local donations.  Both 
services have lost market share due to competition, leading managers to search for better 
pricing strategies. Through a series of focus group interviews and a survey of senior 
managers, Chetkovich and Frumkin (2003) found that mission-market tensions were indeed 
felt by managers across the chapters and departments, and that the strength and resolution 
of such tensions varied according to the nature of services, competition in the market, and 
the impact on the mission.  
 
One strategy used to regain market share was to reduce prices. However, this strategy came 
at a cost. In exchange for price leadership and a larger share of markets, product quality 
was sacrificed. Moreover, a serious problem arose from elimination of cross-subsidies 
between more profitable products and less profitable ones – raised access barriers or 
reduced quality for people in less profitable regions. In essence, decisions based on profit-
maximizing pricing generated tensions among managers trying to address ARC’s mission 
locally. 
 
Chetkovich and Frumkin, (2003) found that the ARC could cope with these tensions in 
three ways. The first was to adjust product, quality, or provider reliability in order to attract 
more customers at competitive prices. The second was to depend more on donations. The 
third was to pursue product and organizational innovations. The ARC case illustrates that 
tensions in pricing arise from market competition and the strength of these tensions varies 
with market conditions.  However, tensions may sometimes be relaxed without too much 
compromise in a variety of indirect ways that circumvent the pricing decision and reduce 
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the pressure for additional fee revenue. 
 
Using Metrics to Manage Mission-Market Tensions 
 
As the forgoing experiences with pricing illustrate, a critical aspect of making resource-
related decisions in the nonprofit context is to recognize the purpose of each activity as it 
relates to sustaining the organization financially versus contributing directly to its mission 
impact.  To develop this recognition, a set of simple metrics which translate into specific 
decision choices can be helpful.  Here we offer a prototype metric using simple Likert-
type scales.  Such a metric can be useful in two ways: as a tool that managers can use to 
think about each resource-related (pricing) decision they make, and as research tools to 
enable scholars to detect the levels of tension present in the operations of nonprofit 
organizations in different fields and decision contexts, so as to illuminate how mission-
market tensions percolate through the myriad of resource-related (pricing) choices that 
nonprofit managers make. 
 
As a context, consider a youth-serving organization that offers recreational services to 
teenagers in a low income neighborhood.  One pricing decision is to determine how much 
to charge families to be members of the organization.  Choices associated with this 
decision can be listed on a scale from 1 to 5, according to the degree to which they favor 
(positive) mission impacts vs. financial impacts.  Thus, a manager who is clear about the 
purpose of the decision will also be clear about what kind of choice needs to be made. 
For purposes of simplicity, Table 1 articulates only the end-points and mid-points on (5 











Table 1   Mission/Market Scale for Pricing 
 
Scale Value 1 3 5 
Mission/Market 
Emphasis 
Mission emphasis Mixed emphasis Market emphasis 
Decision 
Protocol  





ability to pay 
Sliding scale designed 
to break-even and 
accommodate 
differences in ability 
to pay 
Single or multipart 
pricing at/above 
marginal cost to 








limited by financial 
constraint 
Maximum 




It is interesting that these scales suggest fairly straightforward ways to pursue either purely 
market-focused goals or purely mission-focused goals.  It is the middles of the scales that 
require more imagination and creativity.  As the table suggests, these intervening points 
may be characterized by setting limits on acceptable mission and economic impacts and 
then searching within these limits for desirable options.  Of course, such scales do not in 
themselves indicate what decisions should be made.  But they help accomplish two things: 
They force decision-makers to specify their goals for any particular decision and, given 
these goals, they suggest what kinds of choices to make and what their impacts will be.  It 
still remains for managers to put all the pieces together so that the sum total of their 
decisions puts the organization in its desired position of mission impact vs. financial 
success within its constraints of economic feasibility. 
 
Table 2 illustrates various possible patterns for nonprofits with a range of services for 
which pricing decisions are made, ranging from revenue maximizers to mission maximizers.  
In this tableau, mission-focused managers select mission maximizing pricing strategies for 
each priced service they offer, revenue-focused managers select pricing strategies that 
maximize revenue for each service they offer, while mixed-focus managers choose a 
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combination of these strategies, pricing for mission where mission impact potential is high 
and pricing for revenue where income potential is high.  Note that these are possible 
behavioral models, useful for describing observed nonprofit managerial decision making, 
not necessarily optimal strategies for mission maximizers or revenue maximizers. For 
example, a mission maximizing organization could very well employ a mixed pricing 
strategy to achieve an overall maximum mission impact for the organization if it is able to 
find profitable offerings, or alternative revenue sources, which can subsidize mission-
relevant ones.  Similarly, a revenue maximizing organization might mix in some loss 
making activities if it increased its appeal to donors or to customers of its profitable 
services.  However, the foregoing patterns are useful referents for understanding the case 
studies described below, and the manner in which nonprofit managers address the tensions 
they see inherent in their pricing choices. 
  





1 2 3 4 5 
1  $$  MM 
MX 
$$ $$ $$ $$ 
2  MM MX    
3  MM  MX   
4  MM   MX  
5  MM     MX 
 
MM = Across the board mission maximizing pricing 
$$  = Across the board revenue maximizing pricing 
Mx  = Mixed pricing strategy, pricing for mission where potential mission impact is high 
and pricing for revenue where mission potential is low 
Note: 1 indicates high mission potential or pricing intent; 5 indicates low mission potential 
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or pricing intent (i.e., 5 represents maximum revenue intent for pricing ) 
   
Case Studies 
The chief executives and the chief financial , chief operating or development officers, of 
five different types of social service agencies, all belonging to the same local religiously-
affiliated federation, were interviewed.  Since the interviews were held under conditions 
of anonymity, these are described generically as follows: 
• An agency (EC) that provides residential services for the elderly including a 
nursing home, assisted living facility and a hospice.  
• An assisted living facility (AL) that provides several different levels of care for 
residents with varying levels of disability.   
• A religious day school (DS) for children of elementary school and middle 
school age, which includes a summer camp program.   
• A community center (CC) that offers physical fitness, camping, early childhood 
and other programs, and whose mission is to strengthen the quality of life of its 
local religious community.   
•  A family and career services agency (FCS) that offers multiple counseling, 
disabilities, career and employment, and other programs related to its mission 
of maintaining people in their communities and minimizing need for 
institutional care.   
 
Some of these organizations, including AL and DS, are fairly simple and straightforward, 
offering just a few different services, while others, such as CC and FCS, are much more 
complex, offering many different lines of service.  As such they provide interesting 
contrasts in their approaches to pricing. 
   
Elderly Care.  The mission of EC is to provide facilities and services for those elderly and 
disabled who need long term and short term physical, psychological and/or social care, in a 
manner consistent with the religious values of its community; to serve as one of the 
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professional resources to the community regarding aging, disabilities and health, and the 
development of effective approaches to care and services to the aging and disabled; and to 
provide support services for family members of elderly and disabled either on its waiting 
list and/or utilizing any service provided by EC.  
EC operates several programs for which pricing decisions are made, including a 96 bed 
nursing home, a 60 unit residential tower which provides assisted and independent living, a 
hospice, a community based program for seniors, and a gift shop.  The nursing home is 
fixed in its number of beds, determined by the state’s certificate of need process.  The 
home is central to EC’s mission, serving long term patients in three categories: Medicaid, 
Medicare and Private Pay.  The financial goal of the home is to break even.  A profit is 
made on private pay patients to subsidize losses on other patients whose rates are set by the 
federal government.  EC tries to balance the number of private pay and government 
financed patients in order not to veer too far from its mission of serving those in need and 
providing a high quality of services.  Although the home contains both private and semi-
private rooms, EC is constrained by the government to charge the same uniform price for 
each, sometimes making it difficult to fill the latter.   
The residential tower was built with a U.S. H.U.D. grant to serve low income people.  
HUD sets the uniform rental rate and the rent charges for each resident, and compensates 
EC for the difference between the rental rate (currently $850 per month) and the resident 
payments.  Residents are charged on a sliding scale according to income/ability to pay.  
EC has no discretion in setting the prices for this facility.  The residential tower is also 
central to WBJH’s mission.  A goal of the tower was initially to help EC financially by 
generating a profit, but HUD restrictions have made this impossible.  EC is currently 
considering building another tower, without government financing, that would charge 
market rates and generate profits.  EC’s hospice is financed entirely by Medicare whose 
payments are government-determined and which increase at roughly 5% per year.  The 
hospice also attracts private contributions.  This service is considered central to EC’s 
mission as well. 
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The Community Program is a health-focused program to aid seniors on EC’s campus and 
the surrounding community to continue living independently.   It is financed with private 
funds from the local religious federation as well as nominal fees to its users. This program 
is considered complementary but not central to EC’s mission of residential care. Nominal 
charges help defray some costs and offer dignity to participating seniors.   
The EC gift shop is operated by an auxiliary group and is entirely staffed by volunteers.  
Its purpose is to provide a convenience to residents and visitors and to generate profits that 
can be contributed to EC.  The intent to emphasize financial profits does not account for 
its subsidy by volunteer labor. “Mark-up” of its merchandise is considered modest by 
commercial standards. 
In summary, EC focuses strongly on its mission to provide high quality residential care for 
seniors in its local religious community.  It has relatively little discretion in setting prices 
for the three programs that are central to its mission – the nursing home, the residential 
tower and the hospice.  In the former instance, it charges market rates to private pay 
patients in order to compensate for losses associated with its Medicaid and Medicare 
financed residents.  The tension in this instance is to limit private pay to a level that allows 
substantial continued service to low income residents within the government stipulated 96 
bed capacity constraint.  This is a balancing act to maintain fiscal integrity and remain 
focused on mission.  
In the case of the residential tower, there appears to be no pricing discretion, with uniform 
rates determined by HUD.  Residents of differing abilities to pay are accommodated by a 
sliding scale set by HUD but EC receives the flat rate in every case as a combination of 
rental payments and HUD reimbursement.  Given HUD’s proclivity to set rates 
insufficient to cover full costs, EC is contemplating a separate independent living facility 
financed entirely with market rentals.  In the case of the hospice program, EC accepts 
Medicare payment rates set by the federal government and limits its fees to this source. 
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Finally, EC operates two services that are complementary but less essential to its mission – 
its community program and the gift shop.  In both instances, prices are moderated to 
reflect service versus financial goals.  The community program covers a fraction of its 
costs through modest fees while avoiding the stigmas of either charity or exclusiveness.  
The gift shop is essentially run as a service to residents and visitors, and as a fund raiser by 
an auxiliary that presents an annual gift to the EC.   
In sum, EC appears to fit the model of a nonprofit organization seeking to address its 
mission of care to seniors by providing maximum service within pricing policies that are 
tightly constrained by government.  The principal source of mission-market tension is the 
mix of private pay and government supported residents in its nursing home.  Other 
pricing-related decisions (community program and gift shop), for services complementary 
to the mission, appear designed to accommodate service goals and modest fund raising 
objectives. 
The CEO, COO and Development Director were asked to rate each of EC’s key services in 
terms of centrality to mission and intention of its pricing policy.  The results are depicted 
in Table 3.  The mission scale runs from 1 (most central) to 5 (least central) while the 
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Note that both the hospice and residential tower programs are considered essential to 
mission but that there is no pricing discretion, given government requirements.  The gift 
shop serves as a modest cash cow while the community program tries to generate some 
funds, given that it is important but not critical to mission.  The main arena for mission 
market tension for EC is the nursing home program where EC makes the best of its 
situation by engaging private pay clients to a degree necessary to maintain its service to less 
well to do residents. Relative to the stereotype patterns described in Table 2, EC’s approach 
to pricing could be described as leaning towards “revenue maximization”, modified to 
account for important mission impacts, especially in the case of its principal mission-
related activity, the nursing home.    
 
Assisted Living.  The mission of AL is to provide residential and assisted living care to the 
frail elderly. Individuals 65 and older are eligible for residency, with rare exceptions made 
for younger residents.  The state limits who can be admitted – especially individuals 
requiring certain levels of medical assistance such as inoculations, tube feedings, etc.  AL 
is permitted to provide only a limited level of medical support.  The nursing home lobby 
in the state is strong and protects itself from incursion from assisted living programs.  
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Residents may live out their lives at AL unless they become too ill or incapacitated.  
Anyone over 65 is eligible although it is unlikely that very healthy individuals would seek 
residence at AL unless they were particularly in need of the housekeeping and meal service, 
which is included in the rent. 
 
The capacity of AL is constrained by a certificate of need.  The current certificate allows 
for the building of six additional residential units over the present 41 units.  The facility 
has land on its current site to build much more extensively, and zoning laws would permit 
such expansion.  However, neighborhood opposition has led to the ceiling of 47 units 
imposed by the County Commission. 
   
AL’s basic (Level 1) program is the rental of studio, one or two bedroom units, which 
includes a service package encompassing 3 meals and tea and snacks each day, 24 hour 
staffing, weekly housekeeping and linen service.  Additional levels of service are available 
for those with particular needs.  Level 2 provides assistance with Activities of Daily 
Living including bathing, dressing, grooming, assistance with eating, transfers, toileting, 
medication, blood glucose testing and insulin injections.  Level 3 includes incontinence 
management.  Level 4 (Extra Care) provides help to residents with mild dementia. 
 
AL also offers ancillary priced services including cable television, laundry service and pet 
care.  It offers programs to outside groups as well, including a chef’s program, at no 
charge.  In addition, some case management services are provided at no charge.  These 
are considered courtesy services not formally included in AL’s budget. 
 
The (level 1) residential program is the heart of the AL’s mission.  Rental prices are set 
with the objective of breaking even.  The price schedule is uniform according to the size 
of the residential unit and whether the room has a special view.  There is no sliding scale 
but needy individuals are considered for price accommodations on a case by case basis.  
Applications require residents and their immediate families to submit income tax returns.  
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Overall, the rental rates are considered slightly below market compared to local for-profit 
alternatives. 
 
Levels 2 and 3 service enhancements – assistance with activities of daily living and 
incontinence care are also considered vital to the mission.  Pricing of these services is said 
to be “competitive” without intent to make a profit.  According to the current price list, 
level 2 care costs an additional $150 per month for help with one function such as 
grooming or eating, and $300 for 2 or more functions.  The level 3 assistance package 
costs an additional $300 per month. 
 
The level 4 Extra Care package for care of patients with mild dementia is priced at an 
additional $150 above Level 3.  In addition, Extra Care patients can live in special units 
that are priced higher than normal residential units.  Such Extra Care was not part of the 
original intent of AL but experience has shown that residents want it rather than have to 
move to a nursing home when their health declines.  Pricing is set to recover costs of this 
labor intensive service. 
 
AL offers ancillary services including cable television, laundry and pet care, which entail 
additional charges.  Cable television is viewed as a competitive necessity for residents and 
supportive but not critical to mission.  AL is charged by the cable company and in turn 
charges each resident a standard fee.  It is priced to support itself.  Residents have 
various options for their laundry needs.  They can do laundry themselves using the AL’s 
on-site machines, which is too arduous for most residents.  Family members of residents 
can do the laundry either on-site or off-campus.  Some residents do it this way.  The third 
option is for the home to provide laundry service.  This is considered supportive of the 
mission.  Pricing is intended to have the service pay for itself. Only two residents of the 
home use pet care.  It is considered necessary for some residents.  Other homes do have 
“no pet” policies but AL does not.  AL prefers not to lose money on this service. 
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AL has an operating budget of $1,250,000 and receives no government funds.  It receives 
approximately $100,000 from the religious federation and another $80,000 in charitable 
contributions. The rest is rental income.  Over the past 5 years AL has become 
increasingly dependent on rental income for its operating budget.  The other components 
of income have been stable while rents have increased. 
 
AL has an endowment of approximately $500,000 that was left from a larger endowment 
originally assembled to build the facility.  AL is continuing to rebuild the endowment 
rather than use its returns for operating income.  A possible future use of the endowment is 
to build an additional six units, although there are no immediate plans to do so. Overall, 
AL’s pricing strategy appears to be that each of its services should stand on its own 
financially, without any cash cows or heavily subsidized programs.  This is illustrated in 
Table 4 which records the executive director’s ratings of each of AL’s programs in terms of 
mission centrality and pricing intent.  Its services range in terms of their centrality to 
mission, but pricing is approached uniformly in a manner that aims at financial solvency 
and accommodates financially or medically needy residents where necessary.  In terms of 
the generic patterns identified in Table 2, AL is a variant of the “revenue maximizing” 
model, modified to accommodate mission impacts.  That is, each program is expected to 
stand on its own, no matter the level of its centrality to mission, but the objective is to 
extract revenues adequate to support expenses, rather than maximum possible revenues. 
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Day School.  DS is a religious day school that stresses academic excellence, conservative 
religious values, bi-lingual education, and grounding in the global community and an 
international and multi-cultural context.  The school operates at three levels: preschool, K 
through 5, and Middle School – grades 6 through 8.  It also provides a variety of ancillary 
services for which prices are charged.  These include Aftercare (after school supervision); 
After School Clubs; a Summer Camp; Athletic Activities in various sports; Overseas trips; 
Special programming for students with developmental disabilities; and extra fees for books 
and supplies, graduation, year book, and uniforms. 
 
According to the director, budgets are determined for the school programs to reflect the 
school’s values; then tuitions and other sources of funding are set to ensure the programs 
can be supported. The tuition schedules for these programs vary according to options 
offered on the frequency of attendance.  For the Pre-school/Early childhood program, 18 
month and two year olds may attend 2, 3 or 5 days per week, and for half or full days.  
Three year olds attend 5 days per week, for full or half days.  Pre-kindergarten children 
attend 5 days per week, for half or full days.  The tuitions are set uniformly for each 
option.  Scholarships are awarded selectively based on application and recommendations 
of an external consulting service. 
  
Ancillary services are approached differently.   The summer camp is a money making 
proposition, although it helps with mission by creating awareness of the school, building 
community relations with neighborhood residents, and utilizing an otherwise empty 
physical plant during the summer.  No scholarships are awarded for camp attendance. 
Aftercare is a service provided to 4th through 8th graders who want or need to stay after 
school hours, until 5pm.  This yields good public relations for the school and helps 
supplement the regular school program, and is provided at no cost.  Aftercare is also 
provided to 3 year olds up to 5th graders, on an optional custodial basis, between 3:30pm 
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and 6pm.  The latter is not considered a profit center per se but a service that should at 
least pay for itself.  After-school clubs are offered for enrichment purposes and include 
various sports, music, art and other activities.  These programs are subcontracted to 
outside suppliers (individuals or companies).  The school prices the clubs so that it makes 
$5 per student per club.  Supplies, books, uniforms, yearbooks, and graduation ceremonies 
are items considered necessary for students’ performance in school but are charged 
separately.  They are considered essential to mission but the intent is to cover costs. 
       
DS has a $9 million operating budget 85% of which is financed through tuition revenues.  
The remaining 15% is made up of direct fund raising and institutional support through the 
religious federation ($300,000), investment income ($60,000) and other fee revenue from 
facilities rentals, summer camps and ancillary programs.  The school has a total 
endowment of approximately $4 million which includes restricted and unrestricted funds.  
Over the past 5 years, the school has become increasingly dependent on fees, although 
dependence on tuition per se has remained at approximately 80%. 
 
DS’s expansion plans include enhancement of current facilities such as their theatre and 
fine arts program.  The school specifically needs more and improved space.  Other 
priorities are professional development for teachers, hiring an on-site member of the clergy 
and upgrading of technology.  Were additional funds available, the school would increase 
both the quality of its program and the number of students served.  It would not reduce 
fees although it might use funds to accommodate needs of pressed middle class families by 
selectively helping with tuition payments.  Currently the very rich and the very poor are 
accommodated, the latter through a scholarship assistance program.  The executive 
director envisions a tuition voucher program to offset full tuition for pressed middle class 
families. 
 
Currently the school provides some $536,000 per year in scholarships, helping 90 to 100 
families whose income eligibility is processed through an external evaluation service.  In 
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addition, the school offers a 50% tuition discount to school employees, accounting for 
another $500,000 in scholarship assistance.  In terms of management philosophy, the 
school’s intent is to end up in the black every year and to create reserve funds for 
contingencies and growth. 
   
As Table 5 suggests, based on ratings provided by the Executive Director and CFO, the day 
school program is the driver, priced to accommodate mission as much as possible, with other 
programs either expected to pay for themselves or generate net income.  The Summer Camp 
program is somewhat anomalous as it does generate some mission-related community benefit 
(although coldly classified as a “5”) but would be abandoned if not for its financial 
contribution to the organization.  In terms of the stereotype patterns of Table 2, DS can be 
described as following a “mixed” pricing strategy, providing scholarship and other 
accommodations in its most mission-impacting programs, running less critical mission-
related programs on a breakeven basis, and requiring profit from its less mission-related 
activities. 
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Community Center.  The mission of CC is to enhance the quality of life for members of its 
local religious community.  It does so through several core programs including Camping, 
Early Childhood Programs, Physical Fitness and General Program Services.  
Organizational membership in CC is required for several of its core programs including 
Camping, Early Childhood and Fitness, and members are offered discounts in those 
General Programming activities that are open to nonmembers as well. 
CC is currently facing a serious financial challenge as a result of earlier program decisions 
that has left it with an accumulated debt of $12 million, approximately two-thirds of which 
resulted from operating deficits over the past several years while one-third is capital debt 
from building projects.  The new administration of CC is now attempting to run an 
operating surplus of approximately $1 million per year, before debt and interest payments.  
This situation is influencing pricing decisions and decisions to keep or eliminate its various 
programs.  The administration is in the process of using a formal mission/money matrix to 
evaluate each of its services.  
In terms of pricing guidelines, CC’s national umbrella association recommends a 20% 
profit margin on core services.  Within this context, as noted below, CC utilizes sliding 
scale pricing in several areas to accommodate lower income clients.  Overall, CC is now 
very focused on increasing revenue streams.  This is challenging because its prices are 
already at the high end compared to other organizations offering similar services, and there 
is a desire not to sacrifice mission.  Capacity issues also influence pricing.  In programs 
where capacity is limited, CC leans towards charging higher prices to exploit the greater 
revenue potential in this situation. 
CC’s Camping programs are central to its mission. Yet, these programs are priced to make 
profit.  Prices are set according to the particular camp program, reflecting different 
program durations and specializations.  A sliding scale based on income accommodates 
lower income families.  The Early Childhood programs are also considered central to 
mission.  There are different price schedules in the three locations in which these 
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programs are offered.  These variations reflect both quality and capacity limits – prices are 
higher where programs are fully subscribed and in higher quality facilities and lower where 
there is excess capacity or poorer facilities.  The Early Childhood programs also offer 
sliding scale pricing to accommodate lower income families. 
The Membership program is complex, multi-tiered and also central to mission.  
Membership fees account for 12% of total CC revenues, a relatively low percentage 
compared to similar organizations in other cities.  A normal program income/membership 
income ratio is said to be 3:1; at CC it is 7:1.  If one includes membership as part of fee 
revenue then CC depends 90% on fees vs. other sources.  Membership is based on a 3 
tiered system as follows: 
a. Basic (Program Plus) membership is required for participation in Camping and Early 
Childhood programs 
b. Second level (Recreation Plus) membership is required for leagues and sports in 
addition to Camping and Early Childhood 
c. Top level (Total Health) membership is required to participate in the fitness center in 
addition to eligibility for 2nd level services 
Rates are differentiated for individuals, couples, single parent families, families, seniors, 
teens and college students. Most people who belong pay with a single check, suggesting 
that members are fairly well off and more needs to be done to make membership affordable 
to lower income individuals. 
The rates for Total Health membership are less than private sector alternatives but this 
partially reflects the fact that the facilities are not as upscale as those alternatives, though 
still considered good relative to other nonprofits like CC.  Almost all members belong to 
CC’s religious community and there has as yet been no effort to tap into the market outside 
of this community.  In this respect, CC has one of the highest ratios of intra-religion to 
total membership (90%) among organizations of its type in the U.S.   Outside members 
are welcome but marketing to them has not been pursued.  Geography also delimits 
membership.  CC does not substantially serve outlying areas of its metropolitan area and 
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finds it a challenge to bring in members beyond a 20 minute travel radius. 
Under the heading of General Program services, CC offers a very large number of programs 
(estimated at 1000!).  These divide into two general categories: those available only to 
members and those available to members and nonmembers (at differential prices).  These 
programs span a full range from those that are minimally relevant to mission but make 
money to those which are highly mission-relevant and run losses.  Such programs include 
House Mate Match; Theatre of the South (recently closed); programs for the 
Developmentally Disabled; Swimming Lessons; and Religious Education. 
Finally, CC is currently working to overcome some reputation problems associated with 
recent financial difficulties and its history of withdrawing from in-town programming and 
focusing more heavily on its immediate suburban location.  If funds were available, it 
would consider several initiatives including creating new facilities in underserved parts of 
the metro area, reinvesting in its residential camps and perhaps creating a new camp for 
teens, reinvesting in current facilities such as the fitness center and perhaps constructing a 
water park, and increasing membership and subscription in its core services. 
Table 6 reports the pricing strategies for CC’s programs as assessed by its CEO and CFO.  
Here it is clear that membership is the driving factor, priced substantially with financial 
support in mind despite its centrality to mission.  Other highly mission-related programs, 
such as camping and early childhood programming, are even more driven by revenue 
generation in their pricing policies.  Finally, with the exception of programs for the 
developmentally disabled, programs – such as swimming lessons and House Mate Match - 
less central to mission are generally priced to more heavily reflect financial concerns.  
Nonetheless, in all cases there is some sensitivity to mission in setting prices and no pure 
cash cows.  Overall, perhaps because of the financial problems experienced in the past, 
CC’s pricing strategy leans towards a subdued version of the “revenue maximizer” as 
modeled in Table 2.  None of its services are priced purely with mission in mind, some are 
priced carefully so as not to cause problems in strongly mission-related activity, and with 
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one area of exception each is priced with a strong revenue intent, regardless of mission 
centrality. 
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Family and Career Services.  FCS provides comprehensive services to strengthen families 
in its religious constitutency and in the general community in which it is located.  It offers 
services on a nonsectarian basis but its priorities focus primarily on families in its own 
religious community.  While entrepreneurial in style, FCS is also becoming more 
systematic in evaluating and repositioning its roughly 45 programs, with a view towards 
developing areas of excellence, “going deeper” into these areas and moving away from less 
essential programs.  Indeed, the organization has developed a special software program to 
facilitate this strategy.  The software itself is also being sold to other nonprofit 
organizations for use in their strategic decision making. 
FCS has grown rapidly over the past 16 years, from an operating budget of approximately 
$1 million in 1991 which was supported by a combination of United Way and religious 
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federation funding for approximately 75% of its income, to a budget in 2007 of $12.5 
million that is supported by a diversified income portfolio: 25% from United Way and 
federation; 25% from charitable contributions from individuals, foundations and 
corporations; 25% from (program) grants from government and some foundations; and 
25% from fees for services including Medicaid reimbursements.   
 
The philosophy and strategy of the organization has also changed over this period of time, 
from a policy of providing all services at a subsidy to one where reasonable fees are 
charged to ensure financial and organizational health within the context of addressing 
mission.  For example, Meals on Wheels has moved from a service provided free or at 
nominal charge to one that charges modest prices as a matter of course – up to $8 per meal 
in cases where there is a government reimbursement program. The organization is also now 
much more aggressive in its own charitable fundraising. 
 
FCS’s services can be divided into five broad categories: Counseling; Disabilities; Career 
and Employment; Older Adults; and Specialty Services (Miscellaneous).   The first four 
categories are the “pillars” of FCS’s overall programming.  These four pillars embrace 18 
to 20 programs with separate budgets.  Strategically and philosophically, programs are 
driven by the desire to keep people in the community for as long as possible, minimizing 
institutional care.  This principle drives all services.  Within these broad categories, 
JF&CS runs, in the words of its COO, “45 micro-businesses”. 
 
In the category of Older Adult Services, FCS includes Home Care, Meals on Wheels, a 
Senior Transportation service, and Geriatric Counseling. The Home Care program is market 
competitive and generates a profit, and is considered central to mission.  Fees are waived 
or reduced on a case by case basis for individuals unable to pay. The program is 
professionally based and does not use volunteers.  Meals on Wheels, in contrast, uses “an 
army of volunteer drivers”.  The marginal cost of a meal is approximately $6 and, given 
the current volume, each meal entails a $2 indirect overhead cost.  The top fee charged for 
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a meal is $8 (covered largely by a government funding program for a particular group) and 
the average price charged is $4.50.  This program is also considered central to mission and 
is designed to ensure that everyone needing the service gets it. The Senior Transportation 
Service helps seniors get to their medical, social service, recreational and other 
appointments.  It uses fewer volunteer drivers than Meals on Wheels because of the need 
for reliability.  It is a high cost program, averaging $28 per ride (more than a taxi), and a 
high quality service that assists seniors in getting in and out of vehicles, etc. – something 
that would be hard to duplicate with ordinary taxis although there is the possibility of 
contracting it with a transportation company.  The Senior Transportation Service is also 
considered central to mission though somewhat less so than Home Care or Meals on 
Wheels. One reason that this is rated high on mission is that it is prerequisite to the 
effective use of other services by ensuring the necessary mobility of clients. 
 
Geriatric Counseling is a professional service, competitively priced with a minimum fee of 
$25 per hour and use of a sliding scale to accommodate seniors of modest means.  The 
cost is $55 per hour.  Insurance helps to pay some of the charges.  This service is also 
considered essential to mission and is priced to make some money while accommodating 
mission. 
   
Under Disability Services, FCS administers its Independent Living program, intended to 
support challenged individuals living in their homes (or those of relatives).  It includes 
three components – basic care in the home setting; vocational services that provide 
employment and training opportunities; and transportation services under the same 
structure as the Senior Transportation Program.  The home care component includes a mix 
of private pay and Medicaid supported clients.  Medicaid pays $4500 per month for this 
program while private clients pay approximately $3000 per month (under a uniform price 
schedule).  The average cost per day is $6000 so it requires subsidy from sources other 
than fees.   FCS does targeted fund raising to support this program.  There is no strict 
capacity limitation, and Medicaid supported clients are clearly more remunerative than 
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private pay patients.  Moreover, the program is open-ended and is expanded as necessary 
to meet demand. The vocational component pays an additional $30 per day, financed with a 
combination of United Way, federation, private pay, and Medicaid funding.  The 
transportation component has the same structure as the Senior Transportation Program.  
Approximately 60 individuals participate in the home care program, 40 of which also 
participate in the vocational program, while another 20 participate in the vocational 
program only.  Overall, the Independent Living program is able to break even, and is 
considered central to mission.  FCS is slowly becoming more aggressive in its pricing of 
this program, trying to overcome a “sense of entitlement” characterizing some clients who 
are able to pay. 
 
FCS includes several programs under in its category of Traditional Counseling Services.  
These include Psychological and Educational Testing, Domestic Violence Against Women, 
an Adoption Program, and a Big Brothers/Big Sisters program.  The Psychological and 
Educational Testing service is viewed candidly as a cash cow, offering 3 days of private 
testing at a rate of $2100 per client, which is considered slightly below general market rates.  
The CEO and COO observe that there is nothing about this program that is especially 
unique to the religious community that FCS serves, but it is a high quality, very 
professional service well within FCS’s competence.  Domestic Violence Against Women 
is a government funded program which by statute cannot charge fees.  It does not fully 
cover costs but some private grant funds are raised to support it.  It is nonetheless 
considered central to FCS’s mission.  The Adoption Program counsels adoptive and birth 
parents. It helps families in FCS’s religious community to adopt, supports birth mothers 
through health care and income assistance, and carries out the necessary home studies 
required for adoption.  Program finances are assisted by two endowments but overall it is 
a competitive business costing adoptive parents up to $30,000 per child.  It is profitable 
but uncertain from year to year - highly dependent on the number of infants available for 
adoption in any given year.  The adoption program is rated only moderately important to 
FCS’s mission.  While it contributes to families in its religious community, clients are well 
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able to pay and the service is competitive in quality with alternative providers.  Finally, 
the Big Brothers/Big Sisters program pairs volunteers with children from homes where a 
parent is missing or has been lost through death or divorce.  The program is offered 
without charge, in part because it comes into play in difficult family circumstances where it 
is hard to ask for payment.   The religious federation, corporate sponsors, and fund raising 
events help pay for the program, but it loses money.  However, the program is central to 
the culture, values and mission of FCS, with some 20% of its board members having been 
volunteers in it. 
   
FCS’s Specialty Programs are generally aimed at the community at large, receive public 
funding, are nonsectarian in nature and do not align strongly with the religious-community 
aspect of FCS’s mission. These programs include a Dental Clinic which provides care to 
the local community free or at nominal charge and is supported by governmental and 
private grants and contributions on which it roughly breaks even.  It depends strongly on 
approximately 90 volunteer dentists who contribute a half day per month.  It is considered 
strongly related to mission but not central. Finally, Project Connect serves the homeless in 
the local community and runs at a loss of approximately $50,000 per year.  It is also 
considered strongly related but not central to mission and is offered free.  
 
Overall, while FCS does not consider itself a business, it tries to run in a business-like 
fashion. Within this frame of reference, pricing decisions play out differently in different 
programs.  The organization is becoming quite sophisticated with its software programs 
and mission/money analyses to evaluate (and alter, terminate or retain) each of its programs 
and make decisions about their pricing.  The CEO and COO observe that it is difficult to 
close programs but that the discipline of a systematic review and evaluation system helps to 
make these kinds of decisions.  They cite the Senior Adult Sheltered Workshop program in 
the Disabilities portfolio as an example of a recently terminated program.  This program 
was inherited from a merger and was never a perfect fit.  Its client base was diminishing 
and there were better options outside of FCS for the clients.  The agency would have had 
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to upgrade the program in order to successfully compete but it was not sufficiently essential 
to the mission or economical to do so. 
 
Table 7 reports the characterization of program pricing policies by FCS’s CEO and COO.  
The pattern most closely resembles the stereotypical “mixed” pattern suggest in Table 2, 
with some leaning toward revenue maximizing. The most highly mission-relevant programs 
tend to be priced to reflect that status, while there are cash cows as well.  It is interesting 
that FCS’s pricing strategies vary widely by program, depending largely on centrality to 
mission, and that no offerings are considered highly peripheral to mission.  This seems to 
reflect FCS’s explicit strategy of reviewing each of its programs and phasing out those that 
connect poorly with its mission focus.    
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It is interesting that FCS offers few services remotely connected to mission, yet it employs 
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a variety of approaches to pricing, with some nuances that reflect mixed objectives.  For 
example, in the cases of Home Care and Geriatric Counseling, policies reflect the 
opportunity to raise revenues despite their centrality to mission, while in the cases of Senior 
Transportation and the Dental Clinic, pricing for revenue is de-emphasized despite their 
somewhat weaker connection to mission. 
 
                                                                                                         
Conclusion 
 
This paper argues that in principle nonprofit organizations should ultimately judge their 
performance in terms of impact on social mission. Nonetheless, because nonprofits operate 
in a market environment, tensions between responding to the incentives of the marketplace 
and addressing the mission pervade virtually all dimensions of their economic decision 
making, certainly pricing. In order to deal effectively with these tensions, nonprofits must 
analyze both the direct and indirect mission impacts of any program as well as its financial 
implications, and then consider the combination of its programs in order to determine its 
solvency and level of mission achievement. 
 
The richness and complexity of this subject matter suggests this it is fertile for future 
research.  Here, we have taken a first step to describing how metrics can be helpful in 
understanding nonprofit pricing decisions. The matrix-based models described here to 
gauge pricing policy intent in terms of mission and financial contribution, reflect various 
patterns discussed in the nonprofit management literature.  These include revenue 
maximizing, mission-maximizing and mixed pricing strategies.  The five case studies 
presented here lend some credence to these stereotypes while also suggesting that the real 
world is somewhat more complex.  In some of the simpler cases, where nonprofits offer 
relatively few services and face strong constraints (e.g., from government) that reduce or 
eliminate discretion in pricing for some of their services, we found somewhat naïve pricing 
behavior, namely pricing on a service by service basis, without much attempt to 
differentiate pricing policies according to mission impact and market potential. In most of 
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our cases, this pattern resembled a kind of “soft” revenue maximizing behavior, where a 
revenue cushion for the organization was sought through pricing policies that generated 
surpluses where possible, with steps taken to minimize sacrifices to mission.  In other 
cases, a more sophisticated approach to pricing was evolving, entailing explicit assessment 
of the mission relevance and financial contribution of each service so that as a whole, the 
organization could design a combinations of programs that would be both financially 
healthy for the organization and maximally effective in addressing its overall mission. 
 
It is clear overall that nonprofits struggle with the tensions of mission and market, with 
pricing an explicit arena in which decisions to resolve such tension take place.  It is 
reassuring that we did not find evidence of aggressive, revenue maximizing intent, nor did 
we find irresponsible mission impact seeking at the expense of financial health.  Even in 
the cases where pricing policy was preoccupied with generating sufficient revenue, there 
was strong consciousness of mission and a clear preference to patch up the policies where 
mission-related impacts could be damaging, such as in service to individuals unable to pay.  
Nonetheless, it is also clear that nonprofits need to become more sophisticated in deciding 
how to price their services.  The use of simple metrics to gauge mission relevance and 
pricing intent will be helpful in this connection, both for the appropriate choice of pricing 
schedules for particular service offerings and also in balancing the mix of services so that 
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